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ETHICAL DECEPTION BY PROSECUTORS
Rebecca B. Cross*
INTRODUCTION
Last Spring, the Colorado Supreme Court suspended Assistant
District Attorney Mark Pautler for deceitful conduct in securing
the surrender of an axe murderer on a killing spree.1 Although
many thought Pautler's conduct was morally acceptable, discipli-
nary authorities found that he violated ethical rules governing at-
torney conduct. All states have a rule of ethics that prohibits
attorneys from engaging in "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre-
sentation." The interpretation of this rule, especially as applied to
prosecutors, is unclear and controversial.
Using People v. Pautler2 as a case study, this Comment sorts
through relevant, current interpretations of the rule and proposes
an approach for future analysis. Part I discusses the facts leading
up to Pautler's disciplinary charges, the opinions of both the disci-
plinary panel that sanctioned Pautler and the Colorado Supreme
Court, which affirmed the sanction, as well as the public response
to Pautler's actions.' Part II examines how disciplinary authorities
treat prosecutorial deception and the role imminent circumstances
have in such discipline.' Finally, Part III concludes that when
prosecutorial deceit does not involve the formal legal process, de-
ceit may be justified if the moral costs are significantly exceeded by
the moral benefits.5
I. THE PAUTLER CASE
A. Facts
Mark Pautler, a deputy district attorney in Jefferson County,
Colorado,6 was at home one Saturday when he was called to one of
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004. I would like to
thank Professor Bruce Green for his guidance throughout this process.
1. In re Paulter, 47 P.3d 1175, 1184 (Colo. 2002).
2. Id.
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. Mark Pautler has been a prosecutor for over twenty years. Marlys Duran, At-
torney Pautler Appeals to State High Court: He Says He Was Right to Lie to Fugitive
Killer, RoCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 24, 2001, at 20A. He has been involved in a number
of high-profile criminal investigations, including the 1999 shootings at Columbine
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the most disturbing crime scenes of his career.7 As he arrived and
looked in the door to the townhouse, staring back at him were the
eyes of a dead woman sitting duct-taped to a chair surrounded by a
pool of blood; her skull was split, blood and pieces of her brain
were splattered on the floor, walls, and even the ceiling.8 Another
body was discovered by the fireplace with a blood-filled plastic bag
over its head, and a third body, wrapped in garbage bags, was
found by the wall nearby.9
A few minutes later, a call came in from the Denver Police De-
partment, informing Pautler that there were three kidnap victims;
Pautler then left to interview them.10 One of these hostages,
J.D.Y., had witnessed a murder at the townhouse by a William Lee
'Cody' Neal." Neal had brought J.D.Y., a girlfriend's roommate,
to the townhouse saying he had a "surprise" for her.12 Inside, two
women, the owner of the townhouse with whom Neal had been
living for two years, and a woman who was supposed to travel with
Neal to Las Vegas that weekend, lay dead. 3 Neal tied J.D.Y.'s
wrists and ankles spread-eagle to four eye-bolts installed in the
floor just for that purpose, cut her clothes off with a knife, and
terrorized her by placing a piece of an earlier victim's skull, with
bloody hair still attached, on her stomach. 4 He then brought in a
third victim, duct-taped her to a chair facing J.D.Y., welcomed her
to his "mortuary," gave her a cigarette, fed his cat,'5 asked her
"what kind of day she was having," 16 and then killed her by striking
her skull repeatedly with an axe as J.D.Y was forced to watch.17
High School in Littleton. James J. Grogan, 31st Annual Institute on Employment Law:
Ethics, 691 P.L.I. 453, 482 (2002).
7. Steve Jackson, Shades of Black; Defense Attorneys Fight To Save Their Clients
By Comparing Them To Current Residents Of Death Row, DENY. WESTWORD, June
21, 2001, available at http://www.westword.com/issues/2001-06-21/feature2.html/1/
index.html.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Investigators, who heard that the suspect had a handgun and shotgun, were
concerned about the suspect returning to shoot the witnesses and so moved the inter-
views out of the apartment. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see also People v. Pautler, 35 P.3d 571, 575-76 (Colo. 2001), affd, 47 P.3d
1175 (Colo. 2002).
15. Jackson, supra note 7.
16. Kevin Vaughan, Grisly Tale of Murder; Wannabe Bounty Hunter, Witness Tell
How He Killed 3 and Terrorized 3 Others, Then Gave Up, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, July
10, 1998, at 5A.
17. Jackson, supra note 7.
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Then, Neal picked the victim's cigarette up off the floor, smoked it,
placed a gun to J.D.Y.'s head, and raped her.
18
The next morning, Neal took J.D.Y. to her apartment and held
her, her roommate, and a male friend hostage at gunpoint for thirty
hours. 19 During this time he made J.D.Y. tell the others what she
had seen at the townhouse, 20 and dictated the details of his crime
spree into a tape-recorder.2 1 He finally left the three hostages with
instructions to contact law enforcement and gave them a pager
number where he could be reached.22
In the early evening, detectives paged Neal from J.D.Y.'s apart-
ment according to his instructions.2 13 Neal returned the call on a
cellular phone, from which his location could not be determined,
and spoke with Deputy Sheriff Sheryl Zimmerman for over three
and one-half hours. 4 Pautler and one other detective were in the
apartment and observed the situation.2 1 Pautler read notes Zim-
merman passed to him, passed suggestions back to her, and kept
the others informed of the events.26 Neal confessed to the three
homicides, describing them in detail.27 Zimmerman developed a
rapport with Neal, continuously encouraging him to surrender.28
Neal's responses were erratic. Although one minute he would talk
about turning himself in, the next he would claim that he had al-
ready murdered 500 people and would kill again if provoked.29 At
one point, he even indicated that he had seen the officers at the
crime scene and could have harmed them if he had wanted to.
30
Neal asked to speak to a specific lawyer, whom Pautler thought
had left the practice of law but phoned anyway, only to find his
number out of service. 31 Neal then asked to speak with a public
defender; Zimmerman told him they were contacting one.32 No
18. Id.
19. Paulter, 35 P.3d at 575.
20. Jackson, supra note 7.
21. Pautler, 35 P.3d at 575.
22. Id.
23. Vaughan, supra note 16, at 5A.
24. Pautler, 35 P.3d at 576.
25. Id.
26. Id. Zimmerman also held a handheld dictation unit to an extension phone and
recorded the conversation. Id.
27. Pautler, 35 P.3d at 576.
28. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1177 (Colo. 2002).
29. Jackson, supra note 7.
30. Howard Pankratz, Deception by Lawyers Ruled Out, Decision Stems From At-
tempt to Get Murder Suspect's Surrender, DENV. POST, May 14, 2002, at B-01.
31. Pautler, 35 P.3d at 576.
32. Id.
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one, however, made any attempt to do so. 33 Instead, Pautler dis-
cussed with the other law enforcement officers who should pose as
public defender.3 4 Zimmerman thought that Neal was bright and
would be able to sniff out a cop posing as his attorney.35 Pautler
then called his superior, David Thomas, who agreed that extraordi-
nary measures were necessary and decided to speak to Neal
himself. 36
After telling Neal that public defender "Mark Palmer" had ar-
rived, Zimmerman handed the phone to Pautler. a7 Pautler spoke
with Neal for less than seven and one-half minutes s3 during which
Neal, who referred to himself as "one of the most dangerous peo-
ple you will ever have the chance to represent," called his situation
"a friggin' nightmare. '3 9 He told Pautler he wanted three assur-
ances from the sheriff's department before he would surrender,4 °
explaining, "I want to make sure we don't have a three-ring circus.
I want you here so you are on my side, on my track."' 41 To this
Pautler replied, "Right, I'll be present. '42 Pautler dodged Neal's
question as to what his rights were, but told him that he believed
the sheriff's department would honor his requests. 43
A couple of hours later, Neal surrendered in a Target store park-
ing lot and, when advised of his Miranda rights, did not ask to
speak with an attorney."a He was put in a solitary cell and given
the pack of cigarettes.45 In the days following, when Neal was ap-
proached by the public defender's office, he maintained that he
was already represented.46 James Aber, head of the Jefferson
County Public Defender's office, took on Neal's representation
33. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1177 (Colo. 2002).
34. Pautler, 35 P.3d at 576.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at n.2.
39. Sarah Huntley, Prosecutor Admits He Lied: Pautler Says He Posed As De-
fender To "Take A Killer Off The Streets," RoCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 8, 2001, at 4A
[hereinafter Huntley, Posed as Defender].
40. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1177 (Colo. 2002). These three guarantees were
that he would be confined separately from other inmates, that he could smoke ciga-
rettes, and that "his lawyer" would be present. Id.
41. Huntley, Posed as Defender, supra note 39, at 4A.
42. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1177.
43. See id.
44. Jackson, supra note 7.
45. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1178.
46. People v. Pautler, 35 P.3d 571, 577 (Colo. 2001), affd, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo.
2002).
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and learned of the ruse weeks later when he recognized Pautler's
voice on tapes of the phone conversation.47 After several months,
Neal dismissed his Public Defender and continued his case pro se,
with court-appointed advisory counsel.48 Neal pleaded guilty to his
crimes and was sentenced to death.49 He later hired Jeff Pagliuca
to appeal the guilty plea and death sentence on various grounds,
including Pautler's misconduct.5 ° Neal is now said to be "sit[ting]
in a cell watching TV, and reading about what is happening with
Pautler and enjoying every minute of it." 51
B. Disciplinary Charges
In February 2000, Neal's attorney filed a complaint against
Pautler with the Colorado Supreme Court's Attorney Regulation
Committee, which found reasonable cause to proceed with a for-
mal complaint.52 Pautler was charged with violating rule 8.4(c) of
the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides: "It is
professional misconduct for lawyers to... (c) engage in conduct in-
volving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." 53
In March 2001, there was a trial before a disciplinary panel, con-
sisting of Presiding Disciplinary Judge Keithley and two Hearing
Board members.54 Pautler admitted that his conduct violated the
plain wording of Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
8.4(c), but argued that circumstances, such as fear that Neal might
harm others, Neal's unknown location, and the brutal nature of
Neal's crimes, justified his actions.55 If justification or "choice of
evils" may be a defense to criminal conduct, Pautler argued that
they should be a defense to professional misconduct charges.56
47. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1178.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Kieran Nicholson, DA Posed as Defender in Arrest Judge to Weigh Deceit
Complaint, DENV. POST, Apr. 15, 2000, at B03 [hereinafter Nicholson, Deceit
Complaint].
51. David C. Voshell, Editorial, "Cody" Neal Relishing Pautler's Predicament,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 21, 2001, at 23A.
52. Nicholson, Deceit Complaint, supra note 50, at B03.
53. COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr R. 8.4(c)(1992). The sanction
was stayed during twelve months of probation, and Pautler was to take ethics courses
and retake the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination. People v. Pautler,
35 P.3d 571, 589 (Colo. 2001), affd 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002).
54. Pautler, 35 P.3d at 574.
55. Id. at 578.
56. Id. at n.5.
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Pautler also asserted that district attorneys are peace officers au-
thorized to use deception.57
At trial, expert witnesses, including the Jefferson County District
Attorney, the Denver District Attorney, and the former Jefferson
County Sheriff, were to testify that Pautler's conduct was justified
by circumstance. 58 The Denver District Attorney, Bill Ritter, testi-
fied that he shared Pautler's concern for public safety: "I'm sug-
gesting that these are extraordinary circumstances when the
prosecutor has no choice."59 Ritter said that he once lied to a gun-
man who was holding a hostage by promising that he would not
prosecute him, but when the gunman surrendered and released the
hostage, Ritter still prosecuted.60
Nevertheless, the disciplinary panel rejected these arguments.6 1
In the majority opinion, Presiding Judge Keithley, stated that there
is no exception to the prohibition on deceit in the state rules of
professional conduct, explanatory commentary to the rules, or case
law.62 Judge Keithley explained that "although there is a substan-
tial body of law that allows law enforcement personnel to use arti-
fice and deceit in the exercise of their professional duties," Pautler
was not acting in his role as a peace officer, but rather as a law-
yer.63 Therefore, the court reasoned that his conduct should be
tested against the rules of conduct applicable to lawyers.'
The defense of "justification" was also rejected as inapplicable to
professional misconduct, but to the criminal law setting only.65 The
opinion relied mainly on People v. Reichman,66 in which a District
Attorney filed a fictitious criminal complaint against an undercover
officer in order to maintain the officer's undercover status.67
Reichman held that "surrounding circumstances.., do not excuse
the deception imposed on the court. ' 68 Although the disciplinary
panel noted that the attorney in Reichman, unlike Pautler,
57. Id. at 578.
58. Kieran Nicholson, Jeffco Deputy DA Faces Hearing; Telephone Lie got Suspect
to Surrender, DENY. POST, Mar. 5, 2001, at B02 [hereinafter Nicholson, Suspect to
Surrender].
59. Hector Gutierrez, 2 Prosecutors Say They Would Have Lied To Get Killer To
Surrender, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 9, 2001, at 38A.
60. Id.
61. Pautler, 35 P.3d at 578-82.
62. Id. at 578.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 819 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Colo. 1991).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1039.
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deceived the court, it maintained that Reichman's holding is pre-
mised upon the deceit, not the party deceived. 69 The panel re-
jected the notion that the context of deception counts, explaining
that "[i]t is the conduct of the lawyer which dictates whether there
is a violation of The Rules of Professional Conduct, not the effect
of that conduct or the person or entity to which the conduct is di-
rected. ' ' 70 This blanket prohibition on deception was based on a
slippery-slope argument: "[o]nce the door of 'justifiable deception'
is opened, it takes little imagination to speculate about conduct
which could result. '71
In determining Pautler's sanction, the panel found that although
his primary motive was to secure Neal's surrender, Pautler also had
a secondary motive to keep Neal talking about his crimes without
the benefit of legal representation.72 Paulter was suspended for
three months.73 The dissenting opinion stated that the sanction
was inappropriate because Pautler did not have a selfish motive,
only "a legitimate desire to keep Neal in contact with the negotia-
tors for the purpose of effectuating his surrender". 4
On appeal in the spring of 2002, this sanction was affirmed by
the Colorado Supreme Court.75 Justice Kourlis wrote the opinion,
which began with a discussion of the need to remedy falling public
confidence in the legal system, and explained that the profession
was engaged in a nation-wide project to show the public that hon-
esty is a core value.76 The court also relied on Reichman77 as well
as on In re Friedman7 1 and In re Malone79 to reject any justification
defense to a violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Colorado Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct.80 Judge Kourlis restated what the court ruled in
Reichman: "even a noble motive does not warrant departure from
the Rules of Professional Conduct."'81
69. Pautler, 35 P.3d at 579 n.7.
70. Id. at 579 (emphasis omitted).
71. Id. at 586.
72. Id. at 585-86.
73. Id. at 589.
74. Id. at 587.
75. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1184 (Colo. 2002).
76. In re Pauder, 47 P.3d at 1178-79.
77. 819 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Colo. 1991).
78. 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 (Ill. 1979) (prosecutor instructed police officers to tes-
tify falsely in order to collar attorneys who had been taking bribes).
79. 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (App. Div. 1984) (prosecutor instructed a corrections
officer to testify falsely to protect himself from retribution by other officers).
80. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1179-80.
81. Id. at 1180.
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The court was uncertain whether deceit could ever be justified
by an "imminent public harm" exception. 2 It discussed the trial
testimony of the Denver District Attorney who lied to a kidnapper
in order to secure the release of a hostage, and found that even if
averting public harm would justify the Denver District Attorney's
lie, it would not justify Pautler's lie because Pautler had feasible
alternatives.83
Although it did not want to start "second guessing crime scene
tactics" or "opine, in hindsight, as to which opinion was best," the
court explained that Pautler could have called a public defender to
speak with Neal or told Neal that no attorney would be called until
he surrendered.' As Judge Kourlis stated, "we are adamant that
when presented with choices, at least one of which conforms to the
Rules, an attorney must not select an option that involves deceit or
misrepresentation. ' 85 Furthermore, he explained, unlike the Den-
ver District Attorney's situation, Neal was not threatening any spe-
cific person.86 The court reserved the right to apply this "imminent
public harm" exception to "some unique circumstances," but held
that this is not such a case.87
Unlike the disciplinary panel opinion, which acknowledged the
existence of a law enforcement exception to the ethical rules but
finds that Pautler was not acting in his role as peace officer, this
court rejected an exception for prosecutors, because attorneys do
not "move in and out of ethical obligations according to their daily
activities. '88 The obligations that accompany a license to practice
law trump all other duties, including apprehending criminals.8 9
The court also disagreed with the Hearing Board's finding that
Pautler had a secondary selfish motive and found instead that
Pautler's sole motive was to obtain Neal's surrender.90 The Court
found no evidence that Pautler kept Neal on the phone to gain a
tactical advantage in criminal proceedings. Paulter did not try to
elicit incriminating statements from Neal and, because Neal had
82. Id. at 1180-81 n.6.
83. Id. at 1180.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. According to a newspaper report, however, Pautler is quoted as saying
that Neal did threaten to harm officers at the crime scene. Pankratz, supra note 30, at
B-01.
87. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1181 n.6.
88. Id. at 1182.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1183.
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already confessed to the crimes in detail, there was not even a need
for additional evidence. 91
Despite these somewhat different grounds, the court found the
Board's decision reasonable and upheld its sanction stating, "[t]he
fact that [Pautler] lied for what he thought was a good reason does
not obscure the fact that he lied-in an important circumstance
and about important facts." 92 Although the opinion began with an
absolute prohibition on deceit,93 towards the end of the opinion, it
left open the possibility of an exception, holding that "[u]ntil a suf-
ficiently compelling scenario presents itself and convinces us our
interpretation of Colo. RPC 8.4(c) is too rigid, we stand resolute
against any suggestion that licensed attorneys in our state may
deceive or lie or misrepresent, regardless of their reasons for doing
SO."
9 4
C. Public Reaction
Pautler's actions were the subject of many newspaper articles
and editorials. Pautler's critics, many of whom were defense attor-
neys, were harsh. On a talk-radio show, one lawyer called
Pautler's conduct "a capital offense" of the legal profession. 95 One
defense attorney called it "mind numbing" and "unconsciona-
ble." 96 Neal's attorney, Pagliuca, called justifying Pautler's deceit
"the epitome of arrogance," further stating that "[t]he notion that
if the crime is bad enough, government lawyers are entitled to lie is
a flawed one." 97
Some critics felt that Pautler's actions trampled on Neal's Sixth
Amendment rights.98 As one defense attorney said, "it really
doesn't matter how rancid the defendant is. He or she still has the
right to a lawyer without having to run afoul of someone posing as
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1176 (stating that "purposeful deception by an attorney licensed in our
state is intolerable").
94. Id. at 1182.
95. Chuck Green, Lawyer Deserves Leniency, DENV. POST, Mar. 12, 2001, at BO.
96. Karen Abbott & Sue Lindsay, Prosecutor Accused in Impersonation, Deputy
DA Pretended To Be Defense Attorney In Talk With Ax Murderer, Charges Say,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 14, 2000, at 5A.
97. Associated Press, Prosecutor Posed As Defender To Capture Axe Murderer,
TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque), Mar. 9, 2001, at B7.
98. Bill Briggs, Truth Surrenders in Crisis, Lies Necessary at Times Cops Say,
DENV. POST, Apr. 4, 2001, at FO.
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such." 99 Critics also argued that Pautler's deception violated trust,
harming already tense relations between prosecutors and public
defenders in Jefferson County and, more importantly, tainting
Neal's subsequent interactions with his real lawyer. 00 The Presi-
dent of the Colorado Criminal Defense Bar said:
It has to do with a need to trust the attorneys. The need to be
able to put your life and your situation in their hands .... When
law enforcement actually takes the steps of saying, 'I am the de-
fense attorney. I am a person you can confide in and rely on.' If
they are stepping into that special relationship, that violates all
of those relationships and all of those trusts.101
Although Pautler had harsh critics, many applauded him. The
Denver Post officially saluted his actions.' Pautler received nu-
merous phone calls and letters of support from both attorneys and
ordinary citizens.' 0 3 Many referred to his deceit as only a "white
lie. ' 10 4 Letters to the editors of local newspapers called Pautler a
hero. 5 In an article for the National Law Journal, Steven Lubet
said, "[a]s a former criminal defense lawyer and a lifelong civil lib-
ertarian, I believe that Mark Pautler made the right choice. If he
was wrong, he was wrong for a good reason. Let's call it civil diso-
bedience .... 06
Most of all, law enforcement officers rallied behind Pautler10 7
Detectives named him "one of the finest and fairest prosecutors we
have ever worked with.' 0 8 At his trial, law enforcement officers,
including the Jefferson County District Attorney and the Denver
District Attorney, testified that they would have done the same
thing in Pautler's situation. 10 9 The Colorado District Attorney's
99. Abbott & Lindsay, supra note 96, at 5A (quoting defense lawyer Scott
Robinson).
100. Huntley, Posed as Defender, supra note 39, at 4A.
101. Nicholson, Suspect to Surrender, supra note 58, at B02.
102. Editorial, Is Saving Lives Misconduct?, DENY. POST, Mar. 10, 2001, at B-07.
103. Duran, supra note 6.
104. Editorial, Don't Save Any More Lives!, DENV. POST, May 14, 2002, at B06.
105. Betty Von Tersch, Editorial, Mother of Victim Says Pautler Should Be Praised,
Not Prosecuted, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 4, 2001, at 7B.
106. Steven Lubet, A Prosecutor's Complex Dual Role, NAT'L L. J. , June 25, 2001,
at A20.
107. Sarah Huntley, Police Defend Prosecutor: His Posing As Public Defender To
Nab Axe Murderer 'Possibly Averted A Massive Manhunt,' ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar.
2, 2001, at 4A [hereinafter Huntley, Police Defend Prosecutor].
108. Patrick Wilson, Police Officers' Local Expresses Support for Chief Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 4, 2001, at 7B.
109. Gutierrez, supra note 59, at 38A.
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Counsel even filed an amicus brief on his behalf.110 Pautler did not
regret his actions and stated afterwards: "I don't think I did any-
thing wrong""' and "I don't think anyone should be sanctioned for
doing what's right in saving lives. I think it sends a bad message to
lawyers, as a profession, that they should think more about saving
their license than doing what's right.""1
2
Some speculated as to what might have happened had Pautler
not lied to Neal that night. The Golden County Police Chief said
that Pautler "quite possibly averted a massive manhunt that may
have driven Neal to flee, harm other victims or take hostages.""1
3
As one editorial noted, officials in this county were still being
blamed for not doing enough to prevent the Columbine disaster,
and if Neal had not been apprehended, the public would crucify
them again."'
Critics called the disciplinary authorities' sanction of Pautler a
"devotion to legalism""15 with "flaws in reasoning.""16 Addition-
ally, they called for new disciplinary rules to leave more "wiggle
room" for lawyers. 1 7 One such critic, a law professor at the Uni-
versity of Colorado at Boulder noted that many lawyers would feel
uncomfortable adhering to the rules of ethics rules while in
Pautler's situation: "[w]hat seems morally right isn't always what
the ethical rules dictate.""18
William Tuthill, Pautler's attorney and a Jefferson County Dis-
trict Attorney, proposed changing the state's ethical rules to allow
lawyers to lie "if they believe it's reasonable in order to prevent the
imminent risk of serious physical injury." 119 Tuthill explained:
"[w]e're not advocating a system that allows lawyers to engage in
deceit and misrepresentation. What we're saying is, that there are
110. See In re Paulter, 47 P.3d 1175, 1176 (Colo. 2002).
111. John Ingold, Jeffco Deputy DA Censured, Pautler Not Sorry For Actions in
Neal Case, DENV. POST, Apr. 4, 2001, at B02.
112. Tillie Fong, Deputy DA Gets Probation, Jeffco Official Who Posed as Defender
May Appeal His Case to U.S. High Court, ROCKY MT. NEWS, Apr. 3, 2001, at 14A.
113. Huntley, Police Defend Prosecutor, supra note 107, at 4A.
114. Keith Sorci, Editorial, Let the Trial Judge Rule, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 27,
2001, at 30A.
115. Editorial, A Lawyer's Lie: Catching Murderer Rightly Came First, ROCKY
MTN. NEWS, Apr. 8, 2001, at 31.
116. Al Knight, Pautler Ruling is Strained, DENv. POST, May 15, 2002, at B07.
117. See Stephen Tarnoff, Hard Line on a White Lie: Colorado Panel Disciplines
Prosecutor Who Helped Coax Triple Murderer Into Surrendering, 87 A.B.A. J. 32, 33-
34 (2001).
118. Id.
119. Karen Abbott, Attorneys Argue Over Ethics of Lying to Confessed Ax Killer,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 4, 2001, at 22A.
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some times when engaging in deceit is justified when loss of life
and limb are at stake. 120
II. ANALYSIS
A. Prosecutorial Deceit
Prosecutors are treated distinctively under disciplinary rules, and
are often held to higher ethical standards due to their unique role
as justice-seekers.?2 1 As the Supreme Court elucidated in Berger v.
United States:
[The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to gov-
ern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such,
he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,
the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or inno-
cence suffer.122
As such, prosecutors are given additional responsibilities under
rules of professional conduct and have been held to a "special duty
of integrity.1 23 At the same time, however, prosecutors are "regu-
lated less restrictively than other lawyers." '24 This divergent treat-
ment is not seen in ethics rules, but rather in the absence of rules
addressing much of prosecutors' conduct and in the absence of
cases where disciplinary authorities have sanctioned prosecutors. 25
The cases that do address prosecutorial deceit make it clear that,
regardless of what the Colorado authorities may have said in
Pautler, the context of the perpetrated deceit does count. 26 There
are two main lines of case law dealing with prosecutorial deceit.
The cases that find deceit impermissible are those in which prose-
cutors deceive the courts in some way, while the cases which find
deceit permissible deal with prosecutors instructing law enforce-
ment officers to use deceit during investigations. 127
120. Ingold, supra note 111, at B02.
121. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
122. Id.
123. See id.; In re Chancey, No. 3122262, 1994 WL 929289, at*5 (Ill. Atty. Reg.
Disp. Com. Apr. 21, 1994).
124. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors,
88 GEO. L.J. 207, 228 (2000).
125. See id. at 228-29; see also Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of
Prosecutors, 79 N.C.L. REV. 721, 744-55 (2001).
126. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
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Both Pautler opinions rely mainly on three cases, Friedman,l2 8
Malone,'129 and Reichman,13 ° in which laudable motive is found not
to excuse deceit. All of these cases, however, have to do with de-
ceit perpetrated on a court. Friedman involved a prosecutor who
directed police officers to accept bribes and lie under oath in order
to develop evidence against the bribe-takers in subsequent prose-
cutions.131 The opinion sanctioning Friedman noted that "[t]he in-
tegrity of the courtroom is so vital to the health of our legal system
that no violation of that integrity, no matter what its motivation,
can be condoned or ignored. 1 32 One justice noted, "I abhor the
thought of intentionally deceiving a judge. '1 33
The prosecutor in Malone was sanctioned for instructing a cor-
rections officer who was testifying about the beating of inmates to
lie under oath to preserve his identity and protect him from retalia-
tion by the other officers.3 In Reichman, a prosecutor filed ficti-
tious criminal charges with the court to help an undercover officer
maintain his covert status. 135 The officer then appeared in court
and made false statements to the judge who was unaware of the
deception. 136 The reviewing court sanctioned Reichman; in the
opinion it discussed the need to maintain the integrity of the judi-
cial process and stated specifically that it would not "excuse the
deception imposed on the court.' 37
Authorities, however, have not tended to question prosecutors'
use of out-of-court misrepresentations during investigations. 138
Disciplinary authorities have allowed prosecutors to supervise and
direct investigations involving deceit. 39 Law enforcement officers
regularly deceive suspects; it is considered an accepted investiga-
tive technique. 4 Disciplining an attorney for supervising these in-
vestigatory practices would encumber meaningful investigations, so
128. See In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1334-35 (Ill. 1979).
129. In re Malone, 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 607-08 (App. Div. 1984).
130. See People v. Reichman, 819 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Colo. 1991).
131. In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d at 1334.
132. Id. at 1335.
133. Id. at 1339 (Underwood, J., concurring).
134. In re Malone, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 604-05.
135. 819 P.2d at 1035-36.
136. Id. at 1036.
137. Id. at 1039.
138. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 124, at 230.
139. Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932); Apple Corps v. Int'l Collec-
tors Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 474-75 (D.N.J. 1998); see United States v. Parker, 165 F.
Supp. 2d 431, 476-78 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); Gidatex, S.r.L. v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd.,
82 F. Supp. 2d 119, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
140. Gidatex, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 122.
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courts have determined that public policy favors deception over
unchecked lawlessness and have given prosecutors discretion in di-
recting investigations. 141
When prosecutors are directly involved in investigations, the eth-
ical standards that apply are not so clear. Up until 2001, few ethics
opinions or rules had ever directly addressed this question. 42 The
two states that recently took on this issue have decided that prose-
cutors may use deceit during the investigatory stages of a case. In
2001, Oregon amended its disciplinary rules to allow criminal attor-
neys to misrepresent their identity or purpose in investigating be-
lieved unlawful activity. 143 In 2002, a Utah ethics opinion stated
that "as long as a prosecutor's. . .conduct employing dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation is part of an otherwise lawful
government operation, the prosecutor... does not violate [the eth-
ics] Rule[s].' 14 The Committee further stated that there should be
no distinction between supervising an activity and directly taking
part in it.145
Were Pautler's activities investigative? While speaking with
Neal, the police were not conducting an undercover operation but
were investigating unlawful behavior. 46 Higgs v. County of Doug-
las set forth a test to determine whether a prosecutor's activities
are investigative or advocatory, which looks at whether the chal-
lenged conduct occurs prior to the filing of criminal charges and
whether it more closely resembles traditional police conduct or
prosecutorial conduct. 147 The conversation with Neal was prior to
141. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 315 (1966); United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988);
In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 975-76 (Or. 2000); Christopher J. Shine, Deception and Law-
yers: Away From A Dogmatic Principle and Toward a Moral Understanding of Decep-
tion, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 722, 747-48 (1989).
142. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. 02-05, 2002 WL 459018 (Utah St. Bar). Prosecutors
have increasingly become involved in investigative roles. See Rory K. Little, Propor-
tionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role, 68 FORD-
HAM L. REV 723, 732-36 (1999). The ethics rules have not acknowledged the role of
the investigating prosecutor because it was not a role envisioned by the American Bar
Association (ABA) when it promulgated the rules. Id. at 739-43. A more likely ex-
planation is that it has been accepted that the ethics rule prohibiting deceit do not
apply to prosecutors. Prosecutorial discretion has traditionally been considered be-
yond judicial review. Id. at 746-47.
143. OREGON RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(D) (2001). This was
adopted to limit the Oregon Supreme Court's earlier opinion in In re Gatti. Id.
144. See Utah Ethics Advisory Op. 02-05, 2002 WL 459018.
145. Id.
146. People v. Pautler, 35 P.3d 571, 576 (Colo. 2001), affd, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo.
2002).
147. 713 P.2d 840, 853 (Colo. 1985).
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formal charges but does not clearly resemble either traditional po-
lice conduct or traditional prosecutorial conduct, as it was an unu-
sual situation. 48 The Colorado disciplinary panel found that
Pautler was not acting in his role as a law enforcement officer be-
cause he was not acting as a member of the "investigative team
exercising police authority" but rather as an attorney, "giving legal
advice and acting as a consultant.' '1 49
Instead of drawing the line of permissible deceit at whether an
activity is investigative, defense attorney Steven Lubet draws the
line at which part of the legal process the conduct involves. 150 Case
law also seems to draw this distinction. The cases that sanction
deceit for a creditable purpose (Freidman, Reichman and Malone,
the main cases on which the Pautler courts rely), involve misrepre-
sentations that are aimed, at least in part, at securing convic-
tions.'51 In these cases, attempting to justify deceit was seen as an
argument that the ends justify the means. In Olmstead v. United
States, Justice Brandeis chastised the breaking of rules in order to
secure a conviction.' 52 He called such rationale a "pernicious doc-
trine," unacceptable in the administration of criminal law.1 53
Pautler's conduct, on the other hand, was not aimed at obtaining
a conviction or gaining any sort of tactical advantage. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court plainly acknowledged this.1 54 Pautler did not
try to elicit any incriminating statements from Neal.1 55 There was
not even a need for any additional evidence, as Neal had twice con-
fessed to his crimes in detail.156 Rather, Pautler's sole motivation
was to secure Neal's surrender.15 7
B. The Role of Imminent Circumstance
Whether or not Pautler was acting within an investigative role,
his lie would not have been tolerable in ordinary circumstances. If
Neal had been with police officers at the time, it would clearly not
148. See Pautler, 35 P.3d at 576.
149. Id. at 578. Pautler was carrying a gun at the time of his conversation with
Neal. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1178 (Colo. 2002).
150. Lubet, supra note 106, at A20. He explains, "[lying to obtain a conviction
must be absolutely prohibited. Lying to obtain an arrest-well, that has to be judged
case by case." Id.
151. See supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
152. See 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
153. Id.
154. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1183.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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have been acceptable for Pautler to walk in and impersonate
Neal's attorney. The reason may be the content of the
misrepresentation.
The Utah Ethics Advisory Committee, which held prosecutors
may use deceit in undercover operations, also said that conduct
that infringes on the constitutional rights of suspects will violate
Rule 8.4(c).158 Although, critics of Pautler have said that his ac-
tions tread on Neal's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his
right to due process,'59 this is false. Neal's constitutional rights did
not actually come into play until he was in custody.
Pautler's lie did, however, step on attorney-client relations. One
of the purposes of the rule against deceit is to facilitate open com-
munication and trust between a client and his attorney. 160 Many of
those who condemned Pautler's actions felt that they contributed
to Neal's lack of trust of public defenders and the eventual dismis-
sal of his attorney.
Therefore, in determining whether this lie, or any lie, is allowa-
ble it is necessary to consider the context of the circumstances in
which the lie was told.
1. Should Urgency Ever Justify Deception?
Philosophical approaches to when deceit may be justified vary.
A categorical approach, advocated by such philosophers as Kant,
Augustine, and Aquinas, asserts that a lie may never be justified by
circumstance.161 Critics call this approach untenable, often citing a
common hypothetical to illustrate the absurdity of this stance. 62
In the hypothetical, there is an innocent person being pursued by
killers hiding in someone's house. 63 The killers, often described as
Nazi's looking for Jews, come to the door and ask if the innocent
person is there."6 Kant would direct the Nazis to the Jews, reason-
158. Utah Ethics Advisory Op. 02-05, 2002 WL 459018 (Utah St. Bar).
159. Briggs, supra note 98, at FO.
160. See Richard K. Burke, "Truth in Lawyering": An Essay on Lying and Deceit in
the Practice of Law, 38 ARK. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1984).
161. See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 47-
48; Shine, supra note 141, at 740-44; William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of
Quasi-Categorical Moralism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 433, 435 (1999).
162. See Steven H. Resnicoff, Lying and Lawyering: Contrasting American and Jew-
ish Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 937, 949-50 (2002); Shine, supra note 141, at 724;
Simon, supra note 161; Transcript from Professionalism Conference, 52 S.C. L. REV.
481, 536-38 (2001).
163. Transcript, supra note 162, at 536.
164. Id.
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ing that one is not responsible for actions stemming from the truth,
only those stemming from deception.'65
Some modern scholars feel that, although this approach may not
be generally acceptable, lawyers should be held to elevated stan-
dards. At a professionalism conference, one law professor said:
I think lawyers have a unique obligation towards honesty, one
that is far more demanding than the honesty of ordinary moral-
ity .... if... Nazis were at the door of a lawyer and the conver-
sations with them were part of the legal conversation, then Kant
got the answer right. The reasons for this, however, are not
Kant's reasons. The primary reason is that dishonesty is more
destructive of the quality of the legal conversation than anything
else, and the quality of that conversation is the primary good
carried by our practice.' 66
The Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court agreed:
"[lawyers are and should be different! ... as long as we... try to
justify [lies] in a situational way-'a lawyer should not lie, ex-
cept. . .,' I think we are doomed.' 1 67 Some ethics authorities, such
as in Pautler, follow this approach and treat the ethics rules word
for word. Such a literal, or as some critics call it, "superficial" in-
terpretation absolutely prohibits deceit and finds circumstance
irrelevant.168
A contextual approach, advocated by Utilitarians such as Ben-
tham169 recognizes that there are moral costs to lying and holds
that someone should lie only when costs are exceeded by the mor-
ally relevant benefits. 170 Sissela Bok advocates a quasi-categorical
approach under which a lie may only be morally justified in crucial
circumstances.' 7 1 She argues that lying is a slippery-slope, that the
disposition to lie intensifies with the practice of lying. 72 This con-
cern is the reason many feel lying by attorneys should be absolutely
prohibited. As Justice Zlaket said, "[lying] corrodes the individual
lawyer, and it corrodes the profession. The lawyer who lies every
day pretty soon does not know if he or she is lying to a spouse, to a
165. See Shine, supra note 141, at 742.
166. Transcript, supra note 162, at 538.
167. Id. at 535-36.
168. David B. Isbell & Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for
Deception of Undercover Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the
Provisions Prohibiting Misrepresentation Under the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791, 811 (1995).
169. BOK, supra note 161, at 47-48.
170. Simon, supra note 161, at 436.
171. BOK, supra note 161, at 31.
172. Id.
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friend, or to everybody else. In the process, this profession goes
down and down.' 1 73 The disciplinary panel in Pautler also ex-
pressed such a concern, "once the door of 'justifiable deception' is
opened, it takes little imagination to speculate about conduct
which could result.' ' 74
Bok explains that concerns such as averting harm to innocent
persons can outweigh the need for truth.175 She believes that lying
to protect innocent lives, such as to divert the Nazis in the above
hypothetical, is not only morally justified, but also does not invoke
the same caustic concerns. 176 The lies are "neither [ ] likely to en-
courage others to lie nor make it much more likely that the person
who lied to save a life might come to lie more easily or more
often."' 77
Under a broader categorical approach, not only is lying to pro-
tect people's lives ethical, but lying about your identification to in-
vestigate housing discrimination 17 or to get a welfare officer to
take your phone call so that your hungry client may get food
stamps179 may also be considered ethical.
2. Did Urgency Justify Pautler's Conduct?
The Colorado Supreme Court argued that even if averting public
harm would justify some lies, it would not justify Pautler's; it
reserves the right to apply an "imminent public harm" exception to
"some unique circumstance" but finds that this is not such a case. 8°
The Court reasoned that Pautler had feasible alternatives. 18 The
alternatives, however, that the Court presented, such as calling a
public defender to speak with Neal or telling Neal that no attorney
would be called until he surrendered, do not seem practicable.
Pautler and his colleagues worried that exercising either of these
options could have prevented Neal's surrender, and lead to more
killings. 82 The Court also stated that Neal was not threatening any
173. Transcript, supra note 162, at 535.
174. People v. Pautler, 35 P.3d 571, 586 (Colo. 2001), affd, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo.
2002).
175. BOK, supra note 161, at 108.
176. Id. at 40, 108-10.
177. Id. at 109.
178. Transcript, supra note 162, at 537.
179. Simon, supra note 161, at 434-35.
180. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1180 n.6 (Colo. 2002).
181. Id. at 1180.
182. Kieran Nicholson, DAs Support Prosecutor's Deception, Standoff With Killer
Left No Choice, They Say, DENV. POST, Mar. 9, 2001, at B02.
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specific person.183 Pautler is quoted, however, as saying, "[Neal]
even indicated he had gone over to the crime scene and seen the
officers there and could have done them harm.
184
The Colorado disciplinary authorities cite two supposed costs of
Pautler's deceit: the specific cost to Neal and the general cost of
public perception. The costs to Neal appear extremely minimal.
Pautler and Neal only had a seven and one-half minute conversa-
tion. 185 Neal gave Pautler no confidential information. The claim
that Neal may have developed mistrust for attorneys that affected
his future relations with his actual attorney, even if with merit, is
inconsequential. The evidence against Neal was insurmountable
and a trustful attorney-client situation would not have affected the
outcome of his case.
Citing public perception as a reason to strictly adhere to discipli-
nary rules is paradoxical. While lawyers may view ethics as obser-
vance of these rules, the public views ethical conduct in much
broader terms.1 86 As much of the public praised Pautler's conduct,
this strict devotion to rules may have just reinforced the perception
that lawyers are governed by self-important rules that smother
good judgment.1 87 A recent ABA survey showed that sixty-four
percent of people complain that today's attorney is no longer a
seeker of justice.1 88 Allowing Pautler's deception in order to pro-
mote justice could even help refurbish public image of lawyers. 189
III. CONCLUSION
One of the reasons that prosecutors are treated distinctively
under disciplinary rules is their unique role of being more than an
advocate. They may sometimes find themselves in situations that
do not involve the formal legal process. In these situations, the
harms that are normally sought to be prevented by rules of profes-
sional conduct may not apply. Therefore, prosecutors should be
permitted to use deceit when the benefits will significantly out-
weigh any costs involved.
183. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1180.
184. Pankratz, supra note 30, at B-01.
185. People v. Pautler, 35 P.3d 571, 576 n.2 (Colo. 2001), affd, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo.
2002).
186. Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi, 79 A.B.A. J. 60, 62 (1993).
187. Philip Cherner, A Tale of Two Duties, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 18, 2002, at
4B.
188. Hengstler, supra note 186, at 62.
189. Resnicoff, supra note 162, at 949.
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Pautler's deceit facilitated the surrender of a man who had bru-
tally killed three women and who was threatening to kill again. He
lied, not to gain any sort of advocatorial advantage over Neal, but
to protect members of the public. The morally relevant costs of his
misrepresentation, if any, are significantly outweighed by its bene-
fit. Pautler's sanction was thus unwarranted.
